From Chevron Deference to Judicial Skepticism: The Shifting Dynamics of U.S. Administrative Law

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The Chevron doctrine governed the U.S. administrative and regulatory regime since its decision in 1984 until its recent overturn in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo¹ on June 28, 2024. The Chevron Court, in one of the most-cited cases of modern administrative law, ruled that, when a court reviews an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers, it must conduct a two-part analysis.² The first consideration is whether Congress has “directly spoken” on the precise issue.³ If Congress’s intent on the issue is clear, the agency would give way to the expressed intent of Congress.⁴ However, if the statute is ambiguous or silent upon the matter, the court would go on to the second consideration: whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible interpretation, which need not be a sole interpretation, of the statute.⁵

The question of whether the construction of the statute is permissible depends on whether Congress has “explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill” or whether the legislative delegation may be “implicit rather than explicit.”⁶ In the former case, Congress has expressly delegated authority to the agency to flesh out the statute.⁷ Then, such regulations should be “given controlling weight,” as long as they are not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”⁸ In the latter case, in which the delegation is implicit, a court should not replace an agency’s “reasonable interpretation” of a statutory provision with its own interpretation.⁹ In both cases, a court should give deference to the administrative agency’s interpretations of the statute.

However, that has come to change over recent years. A number of Supreme Court Justices voiced their concerns over the Chevron decision. Justice Neil Gorsuch objected to Chevron, indicating that Chevron “[t]ransfer[s] the job of saying what the law is from the judiciary to the executive.”¹⁰ Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the case “wrests from Courts the ultimate interpretive authority to ‘say what the law is,’” and that Chevron is inconsistent with the Constitution.¹¹

Those Justices prevailed in Loper Bright, finally overturning the Chevron case law. On June 28, 2024, in a 6-2 decision (Justice Jackson recused), the Supreme Court overturned the Chevron doctrine.¹² Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, concluded that the deference mandated by Chevron conflicted with the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).¹³ Except in cases where a particular statute delegates authority to an agency, courts are now required to use their independent judgment, with some “careful attention” to the Executive Branch’s judgment to help, in determining whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as mandated by the APA, instead of being required to defer to the agencies’ interpretation.¹⁴

After his rise to power in 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Democrat-dominated Congress passed a series of laws that established new federal agencies as part of the New Deal to help the United States exit the Great Depression.¹⁵ However, as these independent federal agencies gained significant power, Congress grew concerned about their expanding authority, leading to the creation of the APA in 1946 to regulate, standardize, and supervise these agencies.¹⁶ The United States Code chapter incorporating the APA defines “agency” as “each authority of the Government,” without concern to whether it is subject to review by another agency, with the exception of Congress, federal courts, and governments of territories or possessions of the United States.¹⁷ It directs that “[t]o the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”¹⁸ However, while the APA provisions show that the reviewing court makes the final decision, they do not determine whether the original agency action should be adhered to.

Before Chevron was decided in 1984, each court exercised its own independent judgment on the issue of whether administrative agencies had the power to interpret the law.¹⁹ Prior to the Chevron decision, even scholars frequently disagreed about how much deference, if any, should be given to an agency’s decision.²⁰ Some courts granted deference, while others took a stricter, de novo approach; this is evidenced by Professor Colin Diver’s article, in which he wrote, “Two competing traditions in American jurisprudence address the issue of the appropriate allocation of interpretive authority between agencies and courts.”²¹ One of the traditions “views matters of statutory interpretation as questions of ‘law’ reserved for independent determination,” or a de novo approach, “by the judiciary,” while the other tradition “views agencies as delegates, empowered by the legislature to exercise legislative power to articulate and implement public goals,” calling for a deferential approach to agencies’ legal determinations.²²

There are a number of Supreme Court opinions in the pre-Chevron era concerning the interplay between courts and agency decisions. One of the oldest cases, Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,²³ decided in 1944, opened the gate for such deference to administrative agencies, now called “Skidmore deference.”²⁴ The Court ruled that:

[t]he fact that the Administrator's policies and standards are not reached by trial in adversary form does not mean that they are not entitled to respect. This Court has long given considerable and in some cases decisive weight to Treasury Decisions and to interpretative regulations of the Treasury and of other bodies that were not of adversary origin,²⁵

showing that the courts do not automatically defer to agency interpretations in such a circumstance but still recognizing that courts had given weight to administrative rulings and opinions from time to time, especially on technical or specialized matters.

Skidmore deference was a very case-by-case, fact-specific approach.²⁶ Then, more questions arose. What is this “deference,” and when should it be applied? Are there stronger examples of deference than the Skidmore decision? These questions were answered throughout a slew of cases prior to and after Skidmore.

As a starting point, the term “deference” has had varying interpretations. Deference ranged from fully granting decision-making authority to the other party, the agency in this case, essentially taking the “absence of review” approach, to merely acknowledging that someone else has a viewpoint on the matter.²⁷ For example, “legal deference” is when courts give deference to another party’s decision simply because it exists, regardless of whether the particular decision or the party is more likely to be correct or not, like jury verdicts, which get deference without assessing each particular jury’s ability to get a correct answer.²⁸ “Epistemological deference” is when the courts defer to another party’s views because they think that the other party is better suited to resolve the particular issue at hand.²⁹ A good example of this is the above-mentioned Skidmore deference, where agency decisions are respected in a non-binding, persuasive way.³⁰

Additionally, courts considered two factors related to the underlying statute itself before applying deference. First, whether the statute was “administered” by agencies or “applied” by agencies was a crucial distinction.³¹ “Administer[ing]” refers to agencies interpreting statutes which they have some kind of “special responsibility” over, such as when an agency interprets the provisions of the act forming itself, whereas “apply[ing]” refers to agencies interpreting statutes for which they have no responsibility because another agency or the court has the authority to administer the statute; courts usually granted more deference to agencies administering statutes.³²

Second, if agencies administered the statute, whether the question was an “abstract legal . . . question[]” or a “fact-bound, inductive, law-application question[]” mattered.³³ Pure legal questions usually got a lesser or nil deference, mostly de novo, than inductive application questions, which obtained more deference in many pre-Chevron cases.³⁴

NLRB v. Hearst³⁵ was a case adopting such a framework. In this case, the definition of the word “employee,” as stipulated in the Wagner Act, was at issue.³⁶ The respondent, Hearst Publications, argued that the common law standard must be applied in defining the word and that newsboys selling newspapers should be classified as independent contractors, while the petitioner, the NLRB, contended that newsboys selling newspapers were, in fact, employees, according to the NLRB’s findings.³⁷

According to the Court, the Wagner Act, also known as the National Labor Relations Act, is an “administered” act, presumably by the NLRB.³⁸

However, the question related here was more of a “inductive, law-application question” instead of an “abstract, legal question.” From the case, it could be found that the Court was reviewing a law-application question, from the Court’s following words:

In making that body's determinations as to the facts in these matters conclusive, if supported by evidence, Congress entrusted to it primarily the decision whether the evidence establishes the material facts. Hence in reviewing the Board's ultimate conclusions, it is not the court's function to substitute its own inferences of fact for the Board's, when the latter have support in the record. Undoubtedly questions of statutory interpretation, especially when arising in the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to resolve, giving appropriate weight to the judgment of those whose special duty is to administer the questioned statute. But where the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is limited.³⁹

Clearly, the Court emphasized that the facts as determined by the Board are very important, and deference should be given to such fact-specific agency administrations of such a statute. Also, it could be found that the Court’s language is strong here, unlike the Skidmore case, in that the reviewing court’s function is “limited” and the agency “must” determine it initially.

In summary, the Supreme Court looked at two issues prior to the Chevron case: whether the agency “administers” or “applies” the statute at issue and whether the interpretation is a purely legal one, or a law-applying one.⁴⁰ If the case is more like Skidmore, in that the statute is only “applied,” the most deference the Court could grant is the Skidmore, non-binding deference.⁴¹ However, if the case is more like Hearst, the court could grant a stronger deference like the legal deference.⁴² If the interpretation is purely legal, the deference would decrease, while a law-applying interpretation would increase the deference.⁴³

The Chevron decision cannot be fully appreciated without an understanding of the legal and political background that shaped it, particularly in the decades leading up to the landmark 1984 ruling. In the 1960s and 1970s, federal courts took an aggressive approach to reviewing agency actions and inactions, often pushing for more stringent regulations.⁴⁴ This period was marked by a sense of judicial activism where courts frequently intervened in agency decisions on the grounds that these decisions were either “required by law,” procedurally inadequate, or represented “arbitrary and capricious” policy choices.⁴⁵

The courts’ aggressive stance reflected a broader political dynamic, in which judges were generally perceived as being on the political left, especially in contrast to the agencies they were reviewing.⁴⁶ These judges often sought to enforce the objectives of regulatory statutes, operating under the belief that agencies were failing to uphold statutory mandates due to the influence of powerful private interests.⁴⁷ This era was characterized by a pervasive sense of conflict between the judiciary and administrative agencies, with the courts assuming an active role in “correcting” perceived deficiencies in the agencies' implementation of congressional intent.⁴⁸

As a result, courts saw themselves as essential actors in redressing this imbalance, ensuring that regulatory statutes were faithfully implemented in a manner that might otherwise be thwarted by administrative inertia or private interests.⁴⁹ This approach mirrored the activism of the Warren Court, which had taken similarly assertive stances to protect individual rights in other areas of law.⁵⁰

Judge David Bazelon, in 1971, exemplified this judicial philosophy by stating that courts were entering a “new era” of collaboration with administrative agencies, where judicial review would play a critical role in ensuring that environmental legislation achieved its intended outcomes, and it was “necessary” to “insist on strict judicial scrutiny of administrative action.”⁵¹ Bazelon’s framing of the judicial role as a guardian of statutory “promise” highlights how courts perceived themselves as protectors of legislative intent against the “destructive engine of material ‘progress.’”⁵²

The emergence of the Chevron case marked a significant shift in this dynamic. The case arose during the Reagan Administration, which was actively moving toward regulatory retrenchment—a direction sharply opposed by environmental groups.⁵³ The Chevron decision ultimately insisted on a more modest judicial role, characterized by deference to agency interpretations where statutory language was ambiguous.⁵⁴ This shift aligned with a broader political movement favoring regulatory reduction and reflected a newfound “salutary humility” on the part of the judiciary.⁵⁵ A clear example of this shift was the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,⁵⁶ which similarly curtailed the scope of judicial intervention.

In essence, the Chevron ruling represented a departure from the era of aggressive judicial oversight, advocating instead for an institutional shift that favored agency over judicial policymaking.⁵⁷ By recognizing that statutory interpretation often involves policy choices, the decision effectively placed policymaking authority in the hands of agencies, which were viewed as being better equipped to make such determinations.⁵⁸ This institutional shift resonated with President Reagan’s deregulatory agenda and was celebrated by conservative commentators while being met with skepticism from the left.⁵⁹

The landscape that shaped Chevron has since transformed, however, due to rising skepticism about the administrative state and the increasing influence of textualism in statutory interpretation.⁶⁰ Yet, the Chevron decision remains a pivotal point in the evolution of administrative law, underscoring the tension between judicial oversight and agency autonomy in the regulatory state.⁶¹

The Chevron case involved the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) interpretation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.⁶² The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 required states that had not met the national air quality standards, known as nonattainment states, to establish a permit program regulating “new or modified major stationary sources” of air pollution.⁶³ In other words, a permit was required whenever someone constructed a new industrial source or made modifications to an existing one if there was an increase in pollution.⁶⁴ The EPA issued regulations in 1981 allowing states to adopt a plantwide definition of a “stationary source,” where a facility with multiple pollution-emitting devices could modify one piece of equipment without meeting stringent conditions if the total emissions from the plant did not increase—a concept known as the “bubble concept.” ⁶⁵ Basically, the environmental group argued that each and every piece of “source,” such as a building or a smokestack, must receive a permit, while the government argued that a permit may cover the entire plant.⁶⁶

Looking at this from the political perspective, the Democratic Carter Administration adopted a narrower definition of “source,” similar to the one that the environmental groups took; however, the next administration, by the Republican Ronald Reagan, rejected the original definition and adopted the plantwide definition of “source.” ⁶⁷

The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) challenged the governmental interpretation, filing a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, arguing that the EPA’s definition was contrary to the Clean Air Act.⁶⁸ The Court of Appeals sided with the NRDC, holding that the plantwide definition was inappropriate for nonattainment areas because it was inconsistent with the Act's purpose of improving air quality, even though the Court of Appeals did admit that the Clean Air Act does not include an explicit definition of a “stationary source” that the law applies to.⁶⁹

The EPA, Chevron, and other industry groups appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the EPA’s plantwide definition of “stationary source” was permissible under the Clean Air Act.⁷⁰

The Supreme Court started by pointing out the legal error in adopting a “static judicial definition” of “stationary source” that Congress did not use. Next, the Court evaluated whether the Court of Appeals made an “erroneous judgment on the validity of the regulations” due to the legal error.⁷¹

Then, the Court introduced the rule it used throughout the decision and for forty years onward:

When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.⁷²

The rule clarified the muddy waters of the pre-Chevron era and simplified it into the form of a two-step test while increasing the level of deference and making the conditions of deference much easier to meet: whether the Congress had expressed its direct intentions, and whether the agency based itself on a “permissible construction” of the statute. ⁷³

Step one, concerning the “intent” of Congress, has been interpreted in later decisions of the Supreme Court to be an inquiry into whether Congress’s instructions on the matter are ambiguous.⁷⁴ If the instructions are unambiguous, the inquiry should be dropped and congressional intent must be followed.⁷⁵ Here, it should be noted that there is no deference to the agency in this step; rather, the court should decide on its own the question of whether Congress is ambiguous on a statutory term. In other words, the agencies cannot influence the court on whether the governing statute is ambiguous.⁷⁶ If it is not clear, but ambiguous, the court proceeds to the second step, which is whether it is based on a “permissible construction” of the statute.⁷⁷

Then, what do congressional instructions mean in practice? Two sets of laws are applicable here: the APA and the organic statutes that establish the agencies and grant them authority.⁷⁸ Section 706 of the APA states that “court[s] shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.”⁷⁹

At first glance, the text appears to indicate that all agency interpretation actions must go against the APA. However, the language does not restrain a court from relying on an agency interpretation to help the interpretations; thus, deference is permissible under the APA.⁸⁰

As for the organic statutes, Congress does not expressly address the issue of interpretive authority. Instead, these statutes typically grant agencies various powers, including rulemaking and adjudicative authority, without directly commenting on whether courts should defer to agency interpretations of the law.⁸¹ Step two essentially means that an agency’s interpretation of a statute should not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or senseless, even if it does not go against any congressional instructions.⁸²

The Court then identified the reason why they adopted such a rule. Interestingly, the Chevron decision did not refer to the APA or any other statute as the source of agencies’ power, as there are no mentions of the statute throughout the case; rather, it focused on the intentions of Congress.⁸³ The Court cites Morton v. Ruiz⁸⁴ to show that the Supreme Court had allowed administrative agencies to “administer” Congressional programs and that power necessarily includes formulating policies and making rules.⁸⁵

When Congress intends for the administrative agencies to make law-like regulations to fill gaps in the statutory regime, those circumstances are called “legislative delegations,” and they may be explicit or implicit; if Congress made a gap in the rule for the agency to fill, it is a case of explicit legislative delegation, while if Congress’s gap is implicit, it is a case of implicit legislative delegation.⁸⁶ For cases of explicit delegation, agencies’ regulations are “given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”⁸⁷ Meanwhile, for implicit delegations, the Court “may not substitute its own construction” of a statute for a “reasonable” agency interpretation.⁸⁸ In other words, the Court is “legally deferring” to implicitly delegated cases.

The Court also mentioned the pre-Chevron system:

We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations. [This] “has been consistently followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations . . . .

If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.”⁸⁹

Chevron here styled the pre-Chevron system as a form of deference, “considerable weight” being given whenever policy conflicts arise, in a situation where “more than ordinary knowledge” is required to resolve the matters, and the choice of the agencies “should not [be] disturb[ed].”⁹⁰

Thus, because the Supreme Court recognized deference to administrative agencies in certain cases when there was implicit or explicit delegation, or when specific knowledge was required to resolve the matter, the Chevron Court was able to simplify and expand the rule to apply whenever Congress is ambiguous and the administrative agency does not go against congressional intent.

The Court applied the rule it set out, in the same order. First, it determined whether Congress’s instructions were ambiguous, as to whether the term “source” could be applied to the whole factory plant.⁹¹ The Court started a process of statutory interpretation, starting with the definitions section of the statute and going on to the legislative history.⁹² The respondents, consisting of environmental groups, argued that the statute in fact had a clear definition, in the 1970 Amendment to the Clean Air Act, Section 111(a)⁹³ : “The term ‘stationary source’ means any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant.”⁹⁴

However, the petitioners, the EPA, argued that the definition applied only to the new source performance standards (the “NSPS”), not to the permit program, and there was no other applicable definition to the word “source.”⁹⁵ The Court decided for the petitioners at this point, by pointing out that the language is not dispositive and congressional intent was not to confine the agency’s powers but rather to enlarge them.⁹⁶

We are not persuaded that parsing of general terms in the text of the statute will reveal an actual intent of Congress. We know full well that this language is not dispositive; the terms are overlapping and the language is not precisely directed to the question of the applicability of a given term in the context of a larger operation. To the extent any congressional “intent” can be discerned from this language, it would appear that the listing of overlapping, illustrative terms was intended to enlarge, rather than to confine, the scope of the agency’s power to regulate particular sources in order to effectuate the policies of the Act.⁹⁷

Also, the Court maintained that the legislative history intended for the definition to be flexible, because “Congress has never indicated any disapproval of a flexible reading of the statute” even while the agency tried different definitions for the word “source.” ⁹⁸

After ruling that the statute was ambiguous to begin with, the Court quickly held that the EPA’s definition of “source” was a “permissible construction” designed to reduce air pollution while keeping economic growth in mind and allowed the plantwide definition to survive.⁹⁹

Over time, many justices voiced their concerns over Chevron. Justice Breyer, for one, found the Chevron framework to be too simplistic, preferring a more nuanced, context-dependent approach.¹⁰⁰ He felt that a blanket rule of deference was overbroad and that courts should vary deference based on the statute, context, and purpose.¹⁰¹ Breyer suggested that whether courts should defer to agency interpretations depends largely on Congress’s intent.¹⁰² He indicated that courts would need to defer if Congress explicitly instructed them to do so or if it was reasonable to impute such intent based on practical circumstances.¹⁰³ He believed that those circumstances depended upon how much law the agency interpreted: if it was “more closely related to the everyday administration of the statute and to the agency's (rather than the court's) administrative or substantive expertise,” the court should defer; however, if the question is “larger” and “likely to clarify or stabilize a broad area of law,” Congress would have intended for the courts to decide.¹⁰⁴

Justice Scalia took more of a supportive approach to Chevron. He agreed with Breyer that Chevron deference should rest on congressional instructions but diverged in his approach. He emphasized that ambiguity in a statute meant either (1) Congress “intended a particular result, but was not clear about it” or (2) Congress left its resolution to the agency, without “[a] particular intent on the subject.”¹⁰⁵ He went on to say that (1) should be resolved by the courts, but for (2), Congress intended to confer discretion to agencies, and that, under Chevron, in the case of ambiguity, courts must presume (2) and consistently apply deference across cases.¹⁰⁶ Scalia argued that Chevron provided a more accurate and efficient method than the prior case-by-case evaluations, which were often inconsistent, and offered clarity and predictability, allowing Congress to understand that agencies have a measure of interpretive authority when statutes are ambiguous.¹⁰⁷ Despite his strong support for Chevron, Scalia acknowledged uncertainty about its alignment with the APA, opining that “[t]here is some question whether Chevron was faithful to the text of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which it did not even bother to cite.”¹⁰⁸ He did go on to say that “it was in accord with the origins of federal-court judicial review,” in that the judiciary did not issue its method of controlling the federal executive officers, the writ of mandamus, unless “the executive officer was acting plainly beyond the scope of his authority.”¹⁰⁹ In short, Scalia supported Chevron, but had concerns about its connections to the APA.

More recently, the Chevron decision has been attacked by conservatives. Originally celebrated by conservatives for promoting judicial humility, Chevron is now often criticized by the right as allowing excessive deference to agencies.¹¹⁰ This shift stems from deep skepticism about the administrative state and concerns about agency overreach, consolidated power, and threats to constitutional values such as accountability and liberty.¹¹¹ Critics argue that Chevron violates the principle that those limited by law (agencies) should not determine the law’s scope, as seen in Marbury v. Madison,¹¹² because agencies wielding power that they essentially grant to themselves through interpretations of ambiguous statutes may lead to the destruction of checks and balances and foster “authoritarianism.”¹¹³ Justice Kavanaugh, for instance, has warned that Chevron encourages the Executive Branch to aggressively interpret statutory ambiguities to fit policy goals, irrespective of party control.¹¹⁴ He argues that this practice allows political officials to push legal boundaries, potentially subordinating law to politics and undermining judicial checks on executive power.¹¹⁵ This was further questioned in West Virginia v. EPA,¹¹⁶ where the Supreme Court, while not overturning Chevron, imposed restrictions upon it by ruling that the EPA overstepped its authority by issuing a rule that significantly impacted the economy without clear congressional authorization, and emphasizing that when an agency asserts power over an issue of vast economic and political significance, the agency must have clear statutory authority to act.¹¹⁷

The decision by the Supreme Court in Loper Bright took those concerns into consideration and, after a heated debate, overruled Chevron completely.¹¹⁸ The Loper Bright Court, led by Chief Justice Roberts, held that the APA “requires” the courts to “exercise their independent judgment” in determining whether an agency exceeded its statutory authority and courts no longer should simply defer to an agency’s statutory interpretation just because it is ambiguous.¹¹⁹

The Court cited Article III of the Constitution, which assigns the Federal Judiciary the “responsibility and power to adjudicate ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’”¹²⁰ and also quoted Marbury, writing, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”¹²¹ to show that the Judiciary has the responsibility to interpret the law, which includes determining the meaning of statutes.¹²² The Court admitted that the Executive Branch was often awarded respect, but it did not go beyond that and supersede a court’s judgment.¹²³ During the New Deal era, the Court often viewed agency determinations of fact as binding but did not offer similar deference to questions of law.¹²⁴ Throughout that period, the Court “[occasionally] applied deferential review after concluding that a particular statute empowered an agency to decide how a broad statutory term applied to specific facts found by the agency.”¹²⁵ The Court emphasized that there was no Chevron-like deference that extended to all kinds of agency interpretations of statutes.¹²⁶

Then, the Court went on to criticize Chevron in that it did not even attempt to “reconcile its framework with the APA,”¹²⁷ which instructs the “reviewing court” to “decide all relevant questions of law.”¹²⁸ Rather, it went against the APA in that it required the court to “ignore, not follow, ‘the reading the court would have reached’ had it exercised its independent judgment as required by the APA.”¹²⁹ Chevron goes fundamentally against that provision because the “best reading” the Court could have reached, pertaining to the APA and the Marbury decision, is inconsistent with Chevron’s view of a “permissible” one being enough if the agency had taken that approach.¹³⁰ The Court pointed out that “agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory ambiguities,” while the courts do have it, and Chevron erred “in concluding that the inquiry is fundamentally different just because an administrative interpretation is in play.”¹³¹

The Court concluded that stare decisis does not require adherence to Chevron, as its reasoning was flawed and its framework has proven unworkable.¹³² Its concept of “statutory ambiguity” had no fixed definition, and the Supreme Court was forced to clarify the doctrine multiple times, struggling to apply the flawed logic to individual cases.¹³³ Thus, since the reasoning was flawed, the Court ruled that Chevron’s general test was overruled, but it left prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework as is, including the Clean Air Act holding part of the Chevron case itself.¹³⁴

Justice Thomas concurred with the majority opinion to overrule Chevron, pointing out that Chevron deference violates the Constitution’s separation of powers principles.¹³⁵ He agreed with the Chief Justice in that Chevron deference does not align with the APA, which mandates that judges interpret statutory provisions and answer all relevant legal questions independently.¹³⁶ He focused, however, on the constitutional approach. Justice Thomas argued that Chevron undermines Article III of the Constitution by compelling judges to adopt agency interpretations even when judges believe a different interpretation is correct, and that this requirement prevents judges from exercising independent judgment, a fundamental aspect of the judicial role.¹³⁷ He also argued Chevron oversteps the bounds of Article II, which limits the Executive Branch’s power to only the executive powers, because Chevron allows executive agencies to exercise judicial power by interpreting ambiguous statutes definitively, transferring the judiciary’s interpretive authority to the executive.¹³⁸ He opined that it also allows agencies to make law, which goes against Article I, which reserves legislative power for Congress.¹³⁹ From his view, by overruling Chevron, the Court restores a critical element of the separation of powers, which is essential for safeguarding individual liberty.¹⁴⁰

Justice Gorsuch also wrote a separate concurring opinion, arguing that Chevron’s rise represents a deviation from traditional principles of judicial review and separation of powers.¹⁴¹ His argument is rooted in a deep historical analysis, beginning with the common law tradition and extending to constitutional principles, emphasizing the judiciary's role as an independent arbiter of what the law is, rather than allowing executive agencies to interpret statutes with deference.¹⁴²

Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Jackson voiced their dissent in a dissenting opinion authored by Justice Kagan in support of Chevron.¹⁴³ She argued that Chevron’s deference is rooted in sound principles of legislative intent, practical governance, and judicial humility.¹⁴⁴ Justice Kagan argued that Chevron deference aligns with Congress’s intentions when drafting regulatory statutes.¹⁴⁵ She emphasized that Congress often delegates interpretative authority to agencies because it recognizes that it cannot foresee every potential ambiguity or gap in statutory languages, and this delegation is based on the presumption that agencies, with their specialized expertise and experience, are better suited to address these uncertainties.¹⁴⁶ She argued that courts lack knowledge of the specific matters, by stating that “[a]gencies know those programs inside-out; again, courts do not,” and agencies reflect the people’s view better because agencies are accountable to the President, who is elected and thus answerable to the public for policy decisions, unlike courts, who do not directly answer to the people.¹⁴⁷ Kagan’s dissent underscored the importance of stare decisis, as she argued that overturning Chevron would disrupt a well-established legal framework. She pointed out that Chevron has been applied in thousands of judicial decisions over the past four decades, forming the foundation for how Congress, agencies, courts, regulated entities, and the public understand and operate under administrative law.¹⁴⁸ She argued that Chevron is “supercharged” stare decisis because of the significant reliance interests built around it.¹⁴⁹ Congress, the judiciary, agencies, and private actors have all shaped their expectations and actions based on Chevron’s principles, and Chevron should only be overturned with a “particularly special justification,” which she claims the majority opinion lacks.¹⁵⁰ She critiqued the majority’s decision as a “bald assertion of judicial authority” rather than one based on sound legal reasoning.¹⁵¹ Kagan asserted that Chevron embodies a principle of judicial humility, recognizing that agencies, not courts, should resolve ambiguities in complex regulatory statutes.¹⁵² She criticized the majority opinion for exhibiting “judicial hubris,” claiming that it overreached by seizing interpretive power that Congress intended to delegate to agencies.¹⁵³ She further argued that Chevron could be reworked but opposed overturning the doctrine completely.¹⁵⁴

The Loper Bright decision marks a dramatic turning point in the landscape of U.S. administrative law, fundamentally reshaping the balance of power between the judiciary and executive agencies. By overturning Chevron, the Supreme Court has signaled a shift away from deference to agency interpretations and restored a greater degree of judicial control over statutory interpretation. This decision not only reflects evolving views on the separation of powers and the role of administrative agencies but also reveals the increasing tension over the scope of the administrative state.

While critics of Chevron argue that this shift ensures that unelected agencies do not wield excessive power over statutory interpretation, the dissenting view warns of the potential dangers in undermining the expertise and democratic accountability that agencies bring to complex regulatory matters. The new approach emphasizes judicial independence in interpreting statutes, yet it may also lead to greater unpredictability and inconsistency as courts take a more active role in defining statutory meaning. The Loper Bright ruling thus invites significant questions about how agencies will function without the guiding framework of Chevron deference and how courts will manage the increased responsibility of interpreting ambiguous statutes in the years to come.

The Loper Bright decision highlights the enduring struggle to balance judicial authority, congressional intent, and agency expertise in a way that respects democratic principles while maintaining an effective regulatory system. It remains to be seen how this new chapter in administrative law will unfold, but it is clear that the debates surrounding agency deference, judicial review, and the proper role of each branch of government will continue to shape the future of the U.S. administrative state. Already, it is impacting society. In 2024, referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright, the Air Force declined to follow an EPA directive requiring them to create a cleanup plan for drinking water in the area in and around Tucson, Arizona, following contamination of the region’s groundwater by perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances runoff from nearby Air Force bases.¹⁵⁵ Some experts worry that this change could hamper the EPA’s ability to effectively regulate pollutants and protect the environment, especially in addressing complex issues like climate change.¹⁵⁶

Other agencies, like the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), also have their own worries that the overturn of Chevron might weaken the IRS’s authority to make regulations.¹⁵⁷ The elimination of Chevron deference has raised fears that the IRS’s authority to issue regulations may be weakened, particularly in areas lacking specific congressional delegations.¹⁵⁸ In effect, experts fear that more challenges might go towards revenue rulings, and tax guidance and rules may have to go through a more tedious process.¹⁵⁹

Chief Justice Roberts mentioned going back to the Skidmore era could be a solution, giving some respect to the administrative agencies,¹⁶⁰ but it clearly seems that the powerful agencies such as the EPA, IRS, and Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC) will lose much of their regulatory powers. The Supreme Court’s fear of the administrative state is stepping up, and this trend is likely to continue for the next decade, as the six justices who supported this decision will keep their places.

^*Jaean Ohk is a third-year Juris Doctor Candidate at Handong International Law School and completed a Bachelor of Laws at the Korean National Police University.

¹306 U.S. 369, 377 (2024), overruling Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (explaining that since Chevron was decided, courts were restrained by a requirement to defer to agency interpretations when interpreting statutes administered by federal agencies).

²Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842; Gary Lawson, The Ghosts of Chevron Present and Future, 103 B.U. L.Rev. 1647, 1650 (2023).

³Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.

⁴Id. at 842–43.

⁵ Id. at 843 & n.11.

⁶Id. at 843–44.

⁷Id.

⁸Id.

⁹Id.

¹⁰Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

¹¹Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 761 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).

¹²Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024).

¹³Id.at 396.

¹⁴Id. at 412-13.

¹⁵See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557, 1562 (1996) (noting that familiar agencies like the NLRB and the SEC appeared during this time period).

¹⁶See Daniel E. Hall, Administrative Law Bureacracy in a Democracy 2 (4th ed. 2009); Loper Bright Enters., 603 U.S. at 391.

¹⁷5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(A)–(D). This title of the U.S. Code incorporates the definitions provision of the APA. See 5 U.S.C. Part I, Chapter 5, Subchapter II short-title note (describing the APA as the source for the subchapter’s provisions).

¹⁸Id. § 706.

¹⁹See generally Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946) (establishing the law prior to the Chevron decision, under which courts would exercise their independent judgment in such cases).

²⁰ Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing at All: The Origins of the Chevron Doctrine, 65 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2013).

²¹Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 551 (1985).

²²Id.

²³323 U.S. 134 (1944).

²⁴See Nicholas J. Leddy, Note, Determining Due Deference: Examining When Courts Should Defer to Agency Use of Presidential Signing Statements, 59 Admin. L. Rev. 869, 878–79 (referring to Skidmore as the “oldest . . . doctrine[] of judicial review of agency action” and referring to its deferential doctrine as “Skidmore deference”).

²⁵Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.

²⁶ See id. (indicating that administrators’ decisions are not controlling, and the weight of such decisions will vary in different cases depending on particular factors).

²⁷Lawson & Kam, supra note 20, at 9–10.

²⁸Id. at 10.

²⁹Id.

³⁰See id. at 11 (“Skidmore deference, in which agency views expressed in such non-binding instruments as amicus briefs and interpretative rules are given whatever respectful consideration their reasoning and pedigree warrant, is a species of epistemological deference.”).

³¹See id. at 11–12 (indicating that, before and after Chevron, courts have “distinguish[ed]” between statutes “administered” by and “applied” by agencies); Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron and Stare Decisis, 31Geo. Mason L. Rev. 475, 483 (2024) (“Congress [sought] to delegate interpretive primacy to agencies over statutory ambiguities in statutes that agencies administer[.]”) (emphasis added).

³²Lawson & Kam, supra note 20, at 12.

³³See id. at 17, 22–23 (indicating that many cases before Chevron followed a framework in which the deference agencies received “depend[ed] to a great degree upon the kind of legal interpretation involved.”).

³⁴See, e.g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 413–15 (1941) (reviewing a question requiring the opinion of the “expert” in the “industry” with such great deference that the Court would leave its determination untouched unless it was inconsistent with any “sensible exercise of judgment,” but independently evaluating the applicability of the code at issue by its own examination of the code).

³⁵322 U.S. 111 (1944), overruled by Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 504 U.S. 318 (1992).

³⁶Id. at 113; see also Wagner Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1946) (amending the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947).

³⁷Hearst, 322 U.S. at 113.

³⁸Id. at 123.

³⁹Id. at 130–31 (citations omitted).

⁴⁰Cf. Lawson & Kam, supra note 20, at 22–23 (providing that “pre-Chevron law required reviewing courts” to first determine if the agency administered the statute, and, if it did, to secondly determine if the question was purely legal).

⁴¹Id. at 22.

⁴²See id. at 22–23 (indicating that, if the statute is one administered by the agency and not a pure legal question absent knowledge about the issue addressed by the agency, strong deference is likely warranted).

⁴³See id.

⁴⁴Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107Geo. L.J. 1613, 1631 (2019); see, e.g., Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm’n, Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111, 1128–29 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (providing that the court’s “duty . . . is to see that important legislative purposes, . . . are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy[,]” and “conclud[ing]” that the agency’s rules “must go farther”).

⁴⁵Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1631; see, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Reg. Comm’n, 685 F.2d 459, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (ruling that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s promulgation of the Table S-3 Rules was arbitrary and capricious), rev’d sub nom. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983); Scenic Hudson Pres. Conf. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d 608, 624–25 (2d Cir. 1965) (setting aside the Federal Power Commission’s decisions on certain questions because the court deemed them based on an insufficient record).

⁴⁶See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1632.

⁴⁷Id.

⁴⁸See id.

⁴⁹See id.

⁵⁰Id.

⁵¹Env’t Def. Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597–98 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

⁵²Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted).

⁵³See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1633.

⁵⁴See id.

⁵⁵Id.

⁵⁶Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978) (“The court should . . . not stray beyond the judicial province to explore the procedural format or to impose upon the agency its own notion of which procedures are “best” or most likely to further some vague, undefined public good.”).

⁵⁷Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1634.

⁵⁸Id.

⁵⁹See id. at 1633–34.

⁶⁰Id. at 1634.

⁶¹Id.

⁶²Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839–40 (1984).

⁶³Id. at 840.

⁶⁴See 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(5).

⁶⁵Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840–41.

⁶⁶See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1622 (summarizing the question presented in Chevron as whether a source must be a “single building or smokestack,” as argued by environmental groups, or an entire plant, as the government wanted). See generally Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840–41, 859 (explaining that, under the EPA’s promulgated rules, a permit could apply to an entire plant such that plants with more than one “pollution-emitting” device could change or alter a piece of equipment without a permit if the total emissions from the plant stayed the same, whereas respondent environmental group would apply permit requirements to both plants as a whole and components of the plant).

⁶⁷See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1623.

⁶⁸See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 723–25 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (granting petition for review), rev’d sub nom. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

⁶⁹See id. at 722–23, 727–28.

⁷⁰See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840–41.

⁷¹Id. at 842.

⁷²Id. at 842–43 (footnotes omitted).

⁷³Id.

⁷⁴Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1623; see, e.g., Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 325–26 (2014) (concluding that an agency’s exercise of discretion was impermissible because the statute was unambiguous, meaning it could and should have acted based on Congress’s “unambiguous” intent); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 703–04 (1995) (indicating that a lack of unambiguous interpretation by Congress and the presence of latitude in the statute allowed for deference).

⁷⁵Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.

⁷⁶Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1624.

⁷⁷Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.

⁷⁸Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1641.

⁷⁹Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946). The relevant portion of the Act is codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).

⁸⁰See generally id. (providing no indication that courts are prohibited from using agency interpretations for insight).

⁸¹See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1657 (noting that the organic statutes provide interpretive, rulemaking, and adjudicative authority on agencies but not indicating whether courts must defer to them); see, e.g., Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958) (creating the Federal Aviation Agency “to provide for the regulation and promotion of civil aviation” to “foster its development and safety,” but not addressing authority of interpretation).

⁸²Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1624; see Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 751 (2015) (indicating that, even when courts defer to agencies, the agencies must act within the realm of “reasonable interpretation”) (quoting Util. Air. Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 321 (2014) (emphasis in original)).

⁸³See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839–66 (1984) (providing no reference to the APA throughout the opinion); id. at 842–43 (emphasizing Congress’s intention regardless of whether it chose to leave a gap for agencies to fill or provided clear instructions).

⁸⁴415 U.S. 199 (1974).

⁸⁵Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (quoting Morton, 415 U.S. at 231).

⁸⁶See id.

⁸⁷Id.

⁸⁸Id. at 844.

⁸⁹Id. (footnotes and citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383 (1961)).

⁹⁰Id.

⁹¹See id. at 862.

⁹²Id. at 859–63.

⁹³See id. at 859–60 (noting that respondents believed the Act required the EPA to apply the dual definition and pointed to section 111(a)(3) for support).

⁹⁴Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1683.

⁹⁵See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 859–60 (noting that, given NSPS’ sole applicability to the NSPS program, the petitioners argued that it was irrelevant to determining what “stationary source” meant).

⁹⁶See id. at 861–62 (footnotes omitted).

⁹⁷Id.

⁹⁸Id. at 864.

⁹⁹Id. at 866.

¹⁰⁰See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 383 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 377 (1986) (indicating that broad application of the Chevron doctrine as a blanket rule to all statutory interpretation questions involving agencies would be impracticable as there are “too many different . . . circumstances” to reduce the process to one generally applicable rule).

¹⁰¹See id. at 372–73.

¹⁰²Cf. id. at 370, 372 (indicating that Congress’s intent—even if it is merely implied—plays a central role in determining the appropriate judicial attitude in cases of deference to agencies).

¹⁰³ See generally id. at 372 (addressing different but not irreconcilable perspectives on deference in agency cases and indicating that one approach is based on Congress’s intent that courts defer that may be “impute[d]” when Congress was “silent”).

¹⁰⁴Mayburg v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 106–07 (1st Cir. 1984) (Breyer, J.).

¹⁰⁵Antonin Scalia, U.S. Sup. Ct. Assoc. Just., Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, Lecture at the Duke University School of Law (Jan. 24, 1989), in 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 516.

¹⁰⁶Id. (stating that Chevron replaced the choice between approaches (1) and (2), described above, with an “across-the-board presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency discretion is meant”).

¹⁰⁷See id. at 517.

¹⁰⁸United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

¹⁰⁹ Id. at 241–42.

¹¹⁰See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1618–19.

¹¹¹Id. at 1664.

¹¹²5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

¹¹³See Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1664–65.

¹¹⁴Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation,129 Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2150–51 (2016) (book review).

¹¹⁵See id. (noting that Chevron exacerbates political parties’ aggressive tendency to “do whatever they can” to push their agendas under existing statutes).

¹¹⁶597 U.S. 697 (2022).

¹¹⁷See id. at 735.

¹¹⁸See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 386, 396, 400–02 (2024) (stating that mere ambiguity does not warrant taking interpretive power away from courts to bestow it upon agencies, that Chevron is inconsistent with the APA, and that, while Executive Branch interpretations may be respected by a court, they do not “supersede” a court’s interpretation). See also id. at 448, 451 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (deriding the majority of the Court for its “[h]ubris”); Amy Howe, Supreme Court Strikes Down Chevron, Curtailing Power of Federal Agencies, SCOTUS Blog (Jun. 28, 2024, 12:00 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2024/06/supreme-court-strikes-down-chevron-curtailing-power-of-federal-agencies/ (noting the 6-3 split amongst the Justices and describing Justice Kagan’s prediction that the majority’s ruling would cause a “massive shock to the legal system”).

¹¹⁹Howe, supra note 117.

¹²⁰Id. at 384 (quoting U.S.Const. art. III, § 2).

¹²¹Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).

¹²²See id. at 384–85.

¹²³Id. at 385–86 (noting that while the Court has often given “due respect to Executive Branch interpretations of federal statutes” while exercising its independent judgment, the Court is not bound to adopt the Executive Branch’s interpretations).

¹²⁴Id. at 387.

¹²⁵Id. at 388.

¹²⁶See id. at 390.

¹²⁷Id. at 398.

¹²⁸Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946) (later codified in relevant part at 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012)); see Loper Bright Enters., 603 U.S. at 398 (stating that Chevron “defies” the APA’s requirement that the reviewing court decide the relevant questions of law).

¹²⁹Loper Bright Enters., 603 U.S. at 398–99 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.11 (1984)).

¹³⁰See id. at 400 (critiquing Chevron’s holding that, in ambiguous cases, a court should defer to an agency’s “permissible” interpretation of a statute and stating that “[i]n an agency case . . . even if some judges . . . consider the statute ambiguous, there is a best reading all the same[.] . . . It therefore makes no sense to speak of a “permissible” interpretation that is not the one the court, after applying all relevant interpretive tools, concludes is best”).

¹³¹Id. at 400–01.

¹³²See id. at 407.

¹³³See id. at 407–09.

¹³⁴Id. at 411–12.

¹³⁵Id. at 413 (Thomas, J., concurring).

¹³⁶See id.

¹³⁷Id. at 414–15.

¹³⁸See id. at 415.

¹³⁹See id.

¹⁴⁰Id. at 416.

¹⁴¹See id. at 427, 429–30 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).

¹⁴²See id. at 420–21.

¹⁴³Id. at 448 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

¹⁴⁴See id. at 448–50.

¹⁴⁵See id. at 449–50.

¹⁴⁶See id. at 449.

¹⁴⁷Id. at 449–50.

¹⁴⁸Id. at 449, 461.

¹⁴⁹See id. at 451 (arguing that Chevron is “entitled to supercharged” stare decisis in part because so many “governmental and private actors relied on it for so long”).

¹⁵⁰Id. at 449, 451 (quoting Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 588 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

¹⁵¹Id. at 451.

¹⁵²See id. at 450.

¹⁵³Id.

¹⁵⁴See id. at 458, 479 (acknowledging that the Court has “fine-tuned” Chevron caselaw but claiming those refinements are not “flaw[s] in the scheme”).

¹⁵⁵See Edward Carver, Air Force Dodges PFAS Water Cleanup in Arizona, Citing Supreme Court Chevron Ruling, Common Dreams (Aug. 12, 2024), https://www.commondreams.org/news/air-force-epa-pfas.

¹⁵⁶See In the Wake of the Chevron Decision,Yale Sch. of the Env’t (July 16, 2024), https://environment.yale.edu/news/article/wake-chevron-decision.

¹⁵⁷Cf. Martha Waggoner, Supreme Court Decision on Chevron Doctrine Will Affect Tax Pros,J. Acct. (June 24, 2024), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2024/jun/supreme-court-decision-on-chevron-doctrine-will-affect-tax-pros.html (claiming the IRS adjusted its rulemaking procedures under Chevron’s rule and that post-Chevron, there is uncertainty regarding the validity of the “day-to-day regulatory framework” the IRS established under Chevron); Mitchell M. Gans, Does the End of Chevron Deference Mean a Weaker IRS?, Tax Notes (Aug. 19, 2024), https://www.taxnotes.com/featured-analysis/does-end-chevron-deference-mean-weaker-irs/2024/08/16/7kkjx (noting that while Chevron controlled, the IRS created regulations that, post-Chevron, are “vulnerable” to taxpayer challenges).

¹⁵⁸See Joseph K. Fabbi, Future of IRS Authority in Question After Supreme Court Overturns Chevron Doctrine, Dinsmore: Legal Alerts (July 2, 2024), https://www.dinsmore.com/publications/future-of-irs-authority-in-question-after-supreme-court-overturns-chevron-doctrine/ (indicating that the IRS’s rulemaking authority was weakened by Chevron’s overruling and that tax regulations may now have to go through a more “tedious” process); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Steven M. Rosenthal, Congress Can Maintain IRS Rulemaking Authority, Tax Pol’y Ctr. (July 31, 2024), https://taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/congress-can-maintain-irs-rulemaking-authority (noting that while Congress still could maintain the IRS’s “rulemaking authority,” Congress would need to be particular and set an “intelligible principle” to which the IRS could conform).

¹⁵⁹Kelley R. Taylor, Supreme Court Strikes Down Chevron: What It Means for the IRS, Kiplinger, https://www.kiplinger.com/taxes/supreme-court-strikes-down-chevron (last updated June 29, 2024).

¹⁶⁰See Kristine E. Hickman, Anticipating a New Modern Skidmore Standard, 74 Duke L.J. Online 111, 113–14 (2025) (noting that, although Chief Justice Roberts did not explain how Skidmore deference would operate going forward, his opinion hinted at the Skidmore factors’ usefulness). See generally Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 387–88 (2024) (discussing that during the New Deal era, the Court adhered to the traditional understanding that courts decide questions of law and citing Skidmore to acknowledge that interpretations from the Executive Branch could occasionally be given “great weight”).

Jaean OhkSeptember 27, 2025Chevron, Loper Bright, Administrative Law